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Taxing Commercial Sponsorships of
College Athletics: A Balanced Proposal
WILLIAM A. DRENNAN*
"[H]igher education's historical balance between academics and athletics
[has] been distorted by all the money sloshing around."I
What is the proper role of big-time sports in higher education? Expenditures
on athletics are rising three to four times faster than expenditures on
academics. Climbing coaches' salaries, suspensions and scandals, and calls
for reform all suggest imbalance. Current tax law provides an artificial
incentive to expand big-time college athletics by completely exempting
advertising revenue generated from the sale of bowl-game sponsorships and
similar transactions. This Article introduces developments in the field of sports
marketing and proposes an approach for taxing sponsorship payments. The
proposal would tax to the extent of the value of the advertising benefits
provided. If a corporate sponsor pays more than the value of the advertising
benefits received, the excess would be a tax-free charitable gift.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Corporations pay millions annually to sponsor college athletic events and
name college sports venues. 2 Treating all sponsorship payments exclusively as
unrequited charitable contributions on the one hand, or exclusively as arms-
length purchases of advertising on the other, will mischaracterize many
transactions. Consider:
(a) Texas Tech University announced that a corporation would need to pay
fifty percent of the construction cost to obtain naming rights for its new
football stadium. 3 This is at least double (or triple) the price to name a
2 CONGR. BUDGET OFFICE, 2 BUDGET OPTIONS 232 (2009) [hereinafter CBO BUDGET
OPTIONS], available at http://www.cbo.gov/sites/default/files/cbofiles/ftpdocs/ 102xx/
doc 10294/08-06-budgetoptions.pdf (Option 43, highlighting the NCAA's estimate for 2004
and 2005).
3 Alan Schmadtke, Stadium Naming Is Big Business: Corporate Money Is Dictating
the Names of College and Even High School Facilities, ORLANDO SENTINEL, May 25, 2006,
at D1, available at 2006 WLNR 8973720.
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professional sports stadium. 4 Data discussed in this Article reveals no
situation in which a corporation paid fifty percent or more of the
construction cost to name a pro sports arena.
5
(b) The University of Virginia requires that a corporation pay a minimum
of fifty-one percent of a building's value, or fifty-one percent of a new
building's construction cost not covered by the state, to acquire naming
rights.
6
(c) KFC Yum! Inc. paid $5 million to name the University of Louisville's
basketball practice facility, and a marketing expert calculated that KFC
Yum! will acquire roughly the same brand name benefits as if it spent
the $5 million on TV and newspaper advertising. 7
(d) A corporation pays approximately $10 million annually to sponsor a
major college football bowl game, 8 and a consultant determined that
"Tostitos, Federal Express, Nokia and Citi [Bank] received more than
$106 million worth of in-game signage... during telecasts of the
Fiesta, Orange, Sugar and Rose bowls."9
The sponsorship payments in examples (a) and (b) contain a substantial
charitable gift element, while the payments in examples (c) and (d) are arms-
length advertising purchases with no charitable gift involved.
Although the market behavior is diverse and merits a flexible approach, a
special tax rule currently treats all these corporate sponsorship payments the
4 A survey of nineteen naming-rights deals for professional sports venues reported that
the corporate sponsor paid from five percent to twenty-five percent of the total construction
cost. See William A. Drennan, Where Generosity and Pride Abide: Charitable Naming
Rights, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 45, 93-96 app. B (2011). For example, the maker of Heinz
ketchup paid approximately sixteen percent of the total construction cost to name Heinz
Field, the home of pro football's Pittsburgh Steelers. Pepsi paid approximately twenty-five
percent of the total construction cost to name the Pepsi Center where pro basketball's
Denver Nuggets play. Id.
5 1d
6 Andrew Petkofsky, What's in a Name? Colleges Seek Vanity Donors, RICH. TIMES-
DISPATCH (Richmond, Va.), July 28, 2003, at A1, available at 2003 WLNR 2139899.
7 Alex Davis, Yum Puts Its Name on U of L Center, COURIER J. (Louisville), Sept. 20,
2006, at DI, available at 2006 WLNR 25049364 ("[T]he fee compares favorably to the
ongoing costs of 30-second television commercials or quarter-page newspaper ads.").
8 Brent Schrotenboer, Bowls Gone Wild!, SAN DIEGO UNION-TRIB., Dec. 17, 2006, at
C 11, available at 2006 WLNR 22106232 (quoting Chris Anderson of The Marketing Arm, a
national marketing agency).
9 1d. (calculation provided by Image Impact Inc.); see also Nancy J. Knauer, The
Paradox of Corporate Giving: Tax Expenditures, the Nature of the Corporation, and the
Social Construction of Charity, 44 DEPAUL L. REV. 1, 70 (1994) ("John Hancock [Life
Insurance Company] estimated that it received $5.1 million of advertising services in
exchange for its 1990 payment of $1.6 million to be associated with the college bowl game
that now bears its name.").
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same, exclusively as unrequited charitable gifts.10 Current law deems the entire
amounts paid by KFC Yum!, Allstate Insurance,1 1 Meineke Car Care, 12 and
other corporate sponsors as generous, tax-free gifts 13 even when the colleges or
their affiliates are contractually obligated to grant naming rights, display the
commercial sponsors' logos, broadcast the brand names, describe product
features, and furnish other publicity, in exchange for the sponsorship funds. 14
This monolithic portrayal allows these arrangements to completely avoid the
unrelated business income tax otherwise applicable to advertising income.
This special tax rule poses (i) tax efficiency, (ii) equity, and (iii) revenue
problems. Tax efficiency problems arise when taxes artificially change
behavior.15 In this context, the special tax rule encourages colleges to expand
big-time football and basketball programs and aggressively sell advertising.
Removing this artificial tax incentive may help address the concern that
athletics are overemphasized at some universities. 16 Regarding equity, 17 the
current special rule taxes similar transactions in different ways1 8 and in a
manner contrary to the economic substance. Also, the amount of tax revenue
lost with the current rule may be substantial. 19
This Article proposes a new approach that would more accurately analyze
these transactions. The new approach would divide sponsorship payments into a
'
0 See generally I.R.C. § 513(i) (2006). See also infra Part 11 (provided that the
payments are not contingent on the level of publicity and there is no comparative
advertising).
" See Lance Murray, Ranking the College Bowl Games from I to 35, DALL. Bus. J.
BLOG (Dec. 20, 2011, 10:37 AM), http://www.bizjournals.com/dallas/blog/2011/12/ranking-
the-college-bowl-games-from-l.html (the Allstate BCS National Championship Game was
on January 9, 2012).
12 See College Football Bowl Glance, BATON ROUGE ADVOC., Jan. 9, 2012, at C9,
available at 2012 WLNR 537594 (explaining that the Meineke Car Care Bowl was on
December 31, 2011).
13 See Ethan G. Stone, Halos, Billboards, and the Taxation of Charitable Sponsorships,
82 IND. L.J. 213, 215 (2007) ("Underlying... the legislation that ended the controversy, was
an unexamined assumption that there was an important distinction between providing a
charitable donor with public recognition and providing a business with advertising
services.").
14 Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(e)(1 ) (2002).
15 LAURIE MALMAN ET AL., THE INDIVIDUAL TAX BASE 9 (2d ed. 2002) ("The more a
tax changes behavior, the less efficient it is.").
16 See infra Part III.B. 1.
17 A frequent policy goal in designing tax rules is horizontal equity, described as
treating similarly situated taxpayers the same. See Kelly A. Moore, Previously Taxed
Property Credit and the 2035(B) Gross Up, 34 S. ILL. U. L.J. 275, 285 (2010); Richard J.
Wood, Supreme Court Jurisprudence of Tax Fairness, 36 SETON HALL L. REV. 421, 435
(2006).
18 Specifically, tax-exempt colleges generate advertising income and pay no tax, while
other providers of advertising services pay income tax. See infra Part III.B.2.
19 See CBO BUDGET OPTIONS, supra note 2, at 232 (estimating the foregone tax revenue
at $207.6 million over ten years). But see infra Part III.B.3 (arguing that the tax collections
would be higher if colleges could only deduct direct costs related to sponsorships).
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taxable advertising portion and a tax-free charitable gift portion. It would treat
the amount that a hypothetical commercial buyer would pay for similar
advertising benefits from a non-charitable sponsorship as taxable advertising
revenue, and would treat only the excess paid by the commercial sponsor, if
any, as a tax-free charitable gift. This dual-character 20 method would recognize
that a corporate sponsor may be making a part purchase and a part gift. For
example, if a corporation pays Texas Tech University $100 million for the new
football stadium naming rights, 2 1 and a corporate sponsor could have acquired
similar advertising benefits from purchasing TV, radio, newspaper, and other
ads for $60 million,22 Texas Tech University would treat $60 million as taxable
advertising revenue and would treat $40 million as a tax-free charitable gift.
Developments in the field of sports marketing enabling more accurate
appraisals of advertising benefits based on the number of advertising
impressions 2 3 make this proposal viable. Many consulting firms now specialize
in promoting, acquiring, and valuing sponsorship rights. 24
The scope of the charitable tax exemption, 25 and campus commercialism, 26
are favorite topics for scholars and media commentators, but none have
20 The U.S. Supreme Court adopted a dual-character approach in a related context. See
United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 117 (1986) (determining the amount of
a charitable deduction when the donor receives a benefit from the charity in return for the
donation).
21 See supra note 3 and accompanying text.
22 See infra notes 77-90 and accompanying text.
2 3 See, e.g., Greg C. Ashley & Michael J. O'Hara, Valuing Naming Rights 18 (Aug. 8
11, 2001) (unpublished manuscript) (presented to the 76th annual meeting of the Academy
of Legal Studies in Business, Albuquerque, NM), available at http://cba.unomaha.edu/
faculty/mohara/web/ALSB0 I Valuing NamingRights.pdf.
24 See, e.g., Rick Alm, Racing Puts Products on a Profit Fast Track, KAN. CITY STAR,
Sept. 28, 2006, at C1, available at 2006 WLNR 16799565 ("The televised ad impressions
add up fast .... Last season's impressions winner.., was Lowe's Home Improvements
with an estimated 240.3 million impressions absorbed by individual viewers."); Nielsen
SportsTM Offers Advertisers a Deeper Look into Sports Sponsorship, PR NEWSWIRE, June 5,
2006 [hereinafter Nielsen Sports]; Schmadtke, supra note 3, at DI ("Virtu Development
Group ... specializes in naming rights and enhancing cash flow for athletic facilities.");
Sandy Shore, Putting Price Tag on Impressions: Firm Measures Value of Exposure from
Sports Sponsorsips, Hous. CHRON., July 31, 1996,
http://www.chron.com/CDA/archives/archive.mpl/1996_1356729/putting-price-tag-on-
impressions-firm-measures-val.html ("What we're going to have to try to determine is what
is the value of an impression from a logo on footwear versus apparel, versus a billboard and
all the other categories .... " (quoting the president of The Bonham Group)); Rich
Thomaselli, Nielsen to Measure Sports Sponsorship, ADVERTISING AGE, May 3, 2004,
http://adage.com/article/news/nielsen-measure-sports-sponsorship/99102; David Unze,
SCSU Qffers Naming Rights, ST. CLOUD TIMES (Minnesota), Jan. 10, 2010, at 1A, available
at 2010 WLNR 515120 ("Front Row Marketing Service has extensive experience in
assessing the value of... sponsorship and naming rights deals.").
2 5 See generally Boris I. Bittker & George K. Rahdert, The Exemption of Nonprofit
Organizations from Federal Income Taxation, 85 YALE L.J. 299, 319 (1976); Henry B.
Hansmann, Unfair Competition and the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 75 VA. L. REV. 605
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considered the ability to measure the value of advertising impressions, 27 and
none appear to have proposed a balanced, dual-character approach. A dual-
character approach raises challenging implementation issues. For example, how
should the parties value naming rights or other sponsor benefits? Who will have
the initial responsibility to appraise sponsor benefits? If the commercial sponsor
initially appraises, what recourse is available to a charity that disagrees? What
information must they report to the IRS? Can new rules incorporate an
exception for small transactions or when a college provides a mere incidental
acknowledgment of a sponsor? Can new rules permit corporate sponsors to
benefit from a "halo effect" 28 to some extent without triggering adverse tax
consequences? Is it really beneficial to tax charities in these situations? Will the
tax merely shift dollars from charitable causes to government uses? This Article
asserts that the tax law confronts similar practical issues in other contexts and
maintains that importing selected solutions can achieve reasonable outcomes.
A headline-grabbing trend, the sale of college football stadium naming
rights, may provide Congress a golden opportunity to reconsider sponsorship
taxation. Big-time college football programs may follow their cross-campus
counterparts (the basketball programs) and smaller college football programs in
selling stadium naming rights to corporations. The media coverage will be
extensive and the dollars will be elephantine. In 1996 the first Division 1A29
(1989); Susan Rose-Ackerman, Unfair Competition and Corporate Income Taxation, 34
STAN. L. REv. 1017 (1982); Richard Steinberg, "Unfair" Competition by Nonprofits and
Tax Policy, 44 NAT'L TAX J. 351 (1991); Ethan G. Stone, Adhering to the Old Line:
Uncovering the History and Political Function of the Unrelated Business Income Tax, 54
EMORY L.J. 1475 (2005) (considering the rationale for taxing otherwise tax-exempt entities
on their unrelated business income).
26 See generally John D. Colombo, The NCAA, Tax Exemption, and College Athletics,
2010 U. ILL. L. REV. 109 (2010); Richard L. Kaplan, Intercollegiate Athletics and the
Unrelated Business Income Tax, 80 COLUM. L. REV. 1430 (1980); Stone, supra note 13. See
also Erick Dexheimer, Does Big-Time College Football Deserve Its Big Tax Breaks?,
STATESMEN.COM (Dec. 27, 2009), http:www.statesmen.com/news/texas/does-big-time-
college-football-deserve-its-big-149737.html; Gilbert M. Gaul, Op-Ed., The Department of
Lucrative Athletics, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 28, 2009, at A19, available at 2009 WLNR
24060256; George F. Will, Pigskin Piggy Bank, WASH. POST, Jan. 7, 2010, at A17, available
at 2010 WLNR 26706063 ("[T]he universities' athletic programs are not taxed."); George F.
Will, Op-Ed., Tax Breaks for Football, WASH. POST, Oct. 25, 2006, at A17 [hereinafter Will,
Tax].
2 7 See infra notes 77-90 and accompanying text.
2 8 Knauer, supra note 9, at 7 n.27 ("The commensurate benefit that corporations expect
to receive is the result of the generally favorable public perception of transfers to charity
(and charitable organizations), known as the 'halo effect."'); id. at 57 58; Elizabeth M.
Roberts, Note, Presented to You by... : Corporate Sponsorship and the Unrelated Business
Income Tax, 17 VA. TAX REV. 399, 401 (1997).
2 9 See Colombo, supra note 26, at 110 n.4 (2010) (explaining that prior to 2006, the
NCAA referred to the most serious athletic schools as Division IA, and thereafter the
NCAA uses the title Football Bowl Subdivision to describe this group of 120 schools). For
ease of reference, this Article will use the term Division IA.
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school sold football stadium naming rights to a commercial buyer. 30 By mid-
2007, only seven of the 120 Division IA schools had sold football stadium
naming rights, 31 but by mid-2010, the count was fourteen.32 Eventually,
intercollegiate competition likely will lead the biggest, most prestigious football
programs to seek stadium sponsors. 33 Speculation has begun about commercial
names for the football stadiums at Notre Dame, Michigan, Ohio State, and
Stanford. 34
In this Article, Part II succinctly summarizes the current rules that exempt a
college's sponsorship income from tax, describes the tax consequences for the
corporate sponsors, and mentions the role of the National Collegiate Athletic
Association (NCAA), athletic conferences, and other tax-exempt entities that
promote collegiate athletics and may be involved with sponsorships.
Part III seeks to establish that sponsorship payments can have a dual
character (part sale and part gift) and that advances in sports marketing for
estimating the value of advertising impressions allow reasonable
approximations of the advertising benefits acquired by commercial sponsors.
Based on these features of the market, this Article suggests a viable method for
taxing sponsorship payments consistent with economic substance. Part III also
addresses several implementation issues.
Part IV concludes with a reflection on the key benefits of the proposal.
Proper taxation will encourage charities to focus more keenly on their core
educational mission and eliminate an artificial incentive to promote athletics
and commercialism. The proposal also will help clarify future debates on
college athletics and campus commercialism. The Appendix contains a
proposed statute.
30 Davis, supra note 7, at D1 (discussing Louisville University's arrangement with Papa
John's Pizza International and its founder John Schnatter); see also Doug Lesmerises,
Louisville Makes Run for Title Game, PLAIN DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), Nov. 6, 2006, at C7,
available at 2006 WLNR 19284415 (the stadium is nicknamed "The Oven").
31 Jim Bentubo, Colleges Forgoing Millions in Naming-Rights Deals, SPORTS Bus.
DAILY, Aug. 31, 2007, available at http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/article/ 114626.
32 Andrea Adelson, Schools Going Corporate, ORLANDO SENTINEL, July 5, 2010, at C2,
available at 2010 WLNR 13458369.3 3 See generally Joseph McCafferty, The Money Bowl, CFO MAG., Aug. 2006,
available at 2006 WLNR 13792136 ("[P]rograms vie to outspend one another .... ");
Angelique Chengelis, U-M Scrambles to Upgrade Facilities; University Lags Behind Big
Ten RivalsI Michigan State, Ohio State, DETROIT NEWS, July 13, 2003, at 1 C, available at
2003 WLNR 18008141 (discussing pressure on the University of Michigan to match the top-
notch athletic facilities at perennial Big Ten Conference rival The Ohio State University).
34 See Bentubo, supra note 31.
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II. CURRENT LAW: TAXING PRINT ADVERTISING BUT NOT
SPONSORSHIPS
Nonprofit colleges and other eleemosynary entities satisfying certain
requirements are exempt from income tax35 except on income from business
activities that do not contribute importantly to their exempt purpose. 36 As a
result, colleges pay no tax on their tuition revenues or research grants but would
pay tax, for example, on profits from the commercial manufacture and sale of
pasta.37 The law taxing a charity's unrelated business activities 38 is the
unrelated business income tax, or UBIT. 39 Along with private schools, state
colleges are subject to the UBIT notwithstanding concerns about federal
taxation of state governmental entities. 40
Consistent with these general principles, a college or other charity selling
commercial advertising in a scholarly magazine or in a program for a sporting
event pays tax on the advertising income derived.41 Generally advertising
income only escapes tax if the activity is sporadic 42 or if the activity contributes
3 5 I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006) (providing the basic requirements for tax exemption under
this subsection includes that the organization must be organized and operated exclusively for
educational, charitable, or other specified purposes; no part of the organization's "net
earnings [may] inure[] to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual[; and] no
substantial part of the activities [may be] carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting,
to influence legislation").
36 See I.R.C. § 51 1(a) (2006) (imposing a tax on "unrelated business taxable income");
Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1 (d)(2) (1967).
37 See Stone, supra note 13, at 218 (describing New York University's acquisition of
the C.F. Mueller Noodle Company as the "poster case" for the unrelated business income
tax).
38 I.R.C. § 513(a) (2006) (defining the term "unrelated trade or business").
3 9 See Stone, supra note 13, at 218.
40 I.R.C. § 511(a)(2)(B) (2006).
41 See id § 513(c) (2006) (including in the section headings the word "advertising" and
providing that the income from a trade or business is taxable even if the activity is "carried
on within a larger aggregate of ... activities ... which may ... be related to the exempt
purposes of the organization[,]" but the text of the statutory subsection never uses the word
"advertising"); see also United States v. Am. Coll. of Physicians, 475 U.S. 834, 836 (1986)
(concluding that the American College of Physicians must pay tax on its income from the
sale of advertising in its "highly regarded monthly medical journal [The Annals of Internal
Medicine] containing scholarly articles ... [even though the advertisements were for]
pharmaceuticals, medical supplies, and equipment useful in the practice of internal
medicine"); Stone, supra note 13, at 220 n.25 ("Print periodical advertising was the original
impetus for [I.R.C.] Section 513(c)(1) ....").
42 See NCAA v. Comm'r, 914 F.2d 1417, 1425 26 (10th Cir. 1990) (concluding that
under the particular facts involved, the NCAA need not pay tax on its income from the
advertisements in the program for the semifinal and final games of the Men's Division I
Basketball Championship because the sale of the advertising space was not an activity
"regularly carried" on by the NCAA for fiscal year 1981-1982). But see IRS Tech. Adv.
Mem. 91-47-008 (stating that the Tenth Circuit's "analysis is faulty and its legal conclusions
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importantly to the organization's exempt function, such as when the students
working on a school newspaper arrange for and sell the advertising as part of
their education. 43 Following these rules, in 1991 the IRS initially held that when
a tax-exempt organization receives payments from a commercial sponsor in
exchange for an agreement to advertise the sponsor's brand and logo in
connection with a college football bowl game, the tax-exempt organization's
advertising income is taxable. 44
In 1997, Congress reversed the IRS's initial approach and enacted a special
rule45 providing that a college or other tax-exempt organization need not pay
tax on income from the sale of commercial sponsorships. 46 Under this current
rule sponsorship payments are taxed only if the amount of the payment varies
based on the amount of public exposure, 47 or the college advertises the
sponsor's prices, or makes comparisons between the sponsor and its
competitors. 4 8 These exceptions are easy to avoid. 49
As a result, colleges and other tax-exempt organizations promoting
collegiate athletics provide commercial sponsors with substantial publicity and
pay no tax, unlike other sellers of advertising services. For example, in
connection with the Meineke Car Care Bowl Game, Meineke's name and logo
could appear on the twenty-yard line on each side of the field.50 Also, the TV
announcers could frequently refer to the contest as the Meineke Car Care Bowl
and describe the services Meineke provides. Typically the "cumulative
effect... is that a spectator... is able to see the.., sponsor's name/logo about
60 times during the [game], and.., hear the sponsor's name about 50 times
during the [game]." '5 1 Although the college or other exempt organization
receives cash in exchange for providing advertising services, it pays no tax on
its advertising income because the payments are "qualified sponsorship
payments" under the special tax rule. 52
erroneous" in NCAA v. Comm 'r); Colombo, supra note 26, at 136 ("The opinion is just flat-
out wrong.").4 3 See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-1(d)(4)(iv) ex. 5 (1967); see also IRS Priv. Ltr. Rul.
199914035 (Apr. 9, 1999) (finding there to be no tax even if sale ofadvertising is conducted
in part by students and in part by nonstudent supervisory personnel).
44 IRS Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-47-007 (Aug. 16, 1991); IRS Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-31-001
(Oct. 22, 1991); see also Stone, supra note 13, at 222 (identifying the bowl games involved
as the Mobile Cotton Bowl and the John Hancock Bowl).
4 5 I.R.C. § 513(i) (2006) (originally enacted by the Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub.
L. No. 105-34, § 965(a), 111 Stat. 893 (codified as amended at I.R.C. § 513(i) (2006))).
46 I.R.C. § 513(i) (2006) (excluding from the term "unrelated trade or business" the
"activity of soliciting and receiving qualified sponsorship payments").
4 7 1d. § 513(i)(2)(B)(i).
4 8 Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(c)(2)(v) (2002).
4 9 See infra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.
50 See Stone, supra note 13, at 220 (noting for the Capital One bowl game, Capital
One's name was "on both sides of the field at each twenty-yard line").
51 IRS Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-31-001 (Oct. 22, 1991).52 I.R.C. § 513(i) (2006).
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Surprisingly, Meineke could even advertise its prices and make
comparisons with its competitors 53 during the Meineke Car Care Bowl without
violating the qualified sponsorship rules by following a common practice. 54
Meineke could purchase regular commercial time from the TV network during
the Meineke Car Care Bowl. 55 The network ads would not taint the qualified
sponsorship payments under the applicable Treasury Regulations. 56 Thus,
Meineke Car Care could supplement the repetition of its name during the
football game telecast with its regular commercials that advertise price and
make comparisons with its competitors.
These special tax rules treat advertising revenue from the sale of
commercial sponsorships as tax free, just like students' tuition payments,
government research grants, and truly unrequited charitable gifts. This treatment
applies even if the corporate sponsor and the college or other exempt
organization sign a binding contract specifying the advertising benefits for the
corporate sponsor.57
In these sponsorship arrangements, generally there is no significant tax
issue for the corporate sponsor. The corporate sponsor can deduct all
sponsorship payments either as business advertising expenses or charitable
contributions. 58
In regards to the flow of sponsorship revenue, the payments initially may
not flow directly to the colleges. The NCAA, athletic conferences, and other
53 See id. § 513(i)(2)(B)(i) (2006) (excluding contingent payments from the definition
of "qualified sponsorship payments"); Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(c)(2)(v) (2002) (excluding
amounts paid for price advertising and comparative advertising from the definition of
"qualified sponsorship payments").
54 Stone, supra note 13, at 229 ("It is accepted wisdom among experts that a sponsor
should spend several times more on advertising and other efforts to purchase exposure for
(and shape the message of) a sponsorship than it spends on the actual sponsorship." (citing
DAVID A. AAKER & ERICH JOACHIMSTHALER, BRAND LEADERSHIP 198, 201 (2001))).
5 5 Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(c)(2)(v) (2002) (providing that the restriction on price
advertising and comparative ads does not apply to "activities conducted by a [sponsor] on its
own," and stating that "if a payer purchases broadcast time from a television station to
advertise its product during commercial breaks in a sponsored program, the exempt
organization's activities are not thereby [made taxable]").
56 1d.
57 1d. § 1.513-4(e)(1).
58 I.R.C. § 162(a) (2006) (tax deduction for ordinary and necessary business expenses);
id § 170(c)(1) (tax deduction for charitable contributions); see also Stone, supra note 13, at
219 ("Businesses can deduct most payments to charity either as charitable
contributions ... or general business expenses .... "). But see I.R.C. § 170(b)(2)(A),
(d)(2)(A) (2006) (stating that a corporation can only deduct charitable contributions in a year
to the extent of ten percent of its modified taxable income, although any excess can be
carried forward for five years); Treas. Reg. § 1.162-15 (1958) (asserting that if only part of a
payment qualifies as a charitable deduction, the corporation cannot deduct the balance as a
business expense); Singer v. United States, 449 F.2d 413, 421 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (rejecting the
rule of Treas. Reg. § 1.162-15 (1958)); infra Part III.C.4 (regarding this regulation and the
Singer case).
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organizations promoting collegiate athletics may sell naming rights to specific
events, 59 and civic sports authorities may sell naming rights to athletic venues.
60
Funds then may flow from these entities and intermediaries to the college
athletic departments. This Article focuses on the tax consequences for the
colleges, but the same analysis should apply to these other tax-exempt entities
and intermediaries because the sale of advertising services would not contribute
importantly to their tax-exempt purpose. 61 For consistency and ease of
reference, the balance of this Article will describe a college receiving
sponsorship payments, even though it is acknowledged that in practice
sometimes the funds initially will flow to other tax-exempt organizations
involved in collegiate athletics.
III. A BALANCED PROPOSAL USING SPORTS-MARKETING ADVANCES
A. Introducing the Balanced Proposal and Its Alternatives
1. The Proposal and Its Market Foundations
Corporate sponsorships are diverse transactions. Attempts to treat them all
the same have sparked contentious debates and led to unsatisfactory results.
62
The market for naming college sports venues is especially interesting. After a
national study of over 32,000 charitable naming transactions, 63 a leading
consultant observed that the general rule of thumb at educational institutions is
for the sponsor naming a facility to pay fifty percent of the total construction
5 9 See, e.g., IRS Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-31-001 (Oct. 22, 1991) (highlighting that the
organization receiving cash payments from John Hancock Life Insurance Company (the
sponsor) was a nonprofit corporation whose "principal activity is arranging and conducting
the play of [an] annual post-season game"); Stone, supra note 13, at 220 ("The 2005 Capital
One Bowl was organized by Florida Citrus Sports Association, Inc. (FCSA), a tax-exempt
nonprofit whose exempt purpose is to 'promote and foster an interest in amateur
athletics."').60 KFC Yum! Center Projected to Boost U of L Athletic Profits, COURIER J., Oct. 10,
2010, available at 2010 WLNR 20246122 (KFC Yum! will pay the Louisville Authority,
which has a "deal" with the University).
61 See infra Appendix (proposed § 513(i)(1)) (stating that the proposal applies to direct
and indirect sponsorship payments).
62 The IRS's initial attempt to tax all the income from all sponsorship arrangements
drew sharp criticism from the charitable sector. See Stone, supra note 13, at 223. In
response, Congress enacted I.R.C. § 513(i) which effectively treats all corporate sponsorship
payments as unrequited charitable gifts. Some commentators denounce the I.R.C. § 513(i)
approach. See, e.g., Colombo, supra note 26, at 150 ("[B]ig-time college athletics revenues
clearly ... fit the normative tax base: payments for... advertising... are absolutely no
different from ... these same revenues flowing to professional, for-profit sports."); Stone,
supra note 13, at 214.
6 3 
TERRY BURTON, NAMING RIGHTS: LEGACY GIFTS AND CORPORATE MONEY, at xv
(2008).
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cost.64 In contrast, in the market for naming professional sports venues, an
analysis of nineteen naming-rights deals found that in those non-charitable
transactions, corporate sponsors only pay from five percent to twenty-five
percent of total construction costs. 65
Accordingly, this Article proposes a flexible, dual-character approach.
Specifically a college would treat a corporate sponsor's payment as taxable
advertising revenue, except to the extent the payment exceeds the price that a
willing buyer would pay for the advertising impressions in a non-charitable,
arms-length transaction. This approach is consistent with the rationales for
imposing the unrelated business income tax and with the definition of fair
market value for federal tax purposes.66 Also, it would not disturb the
traditional approach allowing corporations charitable deductions when they
purchase a "halo effect."'67 Arguably, corporations seldom donate out of pure
altruism, 68 and instead normally donate to obtain a halo effect from the public
recognition and being associated with the charity. This proposal pegs the tax
consequences to the cost of comparable non-charitable advertising
impressions 69 and thereby treats any charitable premium paid, including the
amount paid for the halo effect, as a charitable gift.70
For example, presume the University of Virginia will construct a new
basketball practice facility for $10 million, and XYZ Corporation transfers $6
million to the University and acquires the right to name the facility. 71 If the
market price for acquiring comparable advertising impressions from TV or
radio commercials would be $4 million, and the halo effect of being affiliated
with a prestigious university would provide additional brand name benefits
worth $1 million (for a total return benefit of $5 million), the University of
Virginia would treat $4 million as taxable advertising revenue 72 and treat the $2
million balance as a tax-free charitable gift under this proposal. Purists might
argue that the University of Virginia should have $5 million of taxable
advertising revenue,73 but for decades the tax law has allowed corporations to
6 4 1d. at 142-43.
6 5 See Drennan, supra note 4, at 93-96 app. B.
66 See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-1(c)(2) (1972) (providing that fair market value is "the
price at which the property would change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller,
neither being under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of
relevant facts").67 Knauer, supra note 9, at 7 n.27.
6 8 See id. at 57-59.
6 9 See infra notes 201-03 and accompanying text.
7 0 See infra Part III.A.1.
71 The University of Virginia requires that a corporation naming a campus building pay
at least fifty-one percent of the building's value. See supra note 6 and accompanying text.
72 The University would not pay tax on the entire $4 million of advertising revenue.
Rather, it would deduct direct expenses in calculating its unrelated business taxable income.
See infra Part 11I.B.3.
73 The purist might wish to also tax the $1 million "halo" benefit the sponsor receives.
See infra notes 196 203 and accompanying text.
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deduct transfers to charities when they have benefited from associating with the
charity. 74 Disturbing this tax approach would be a radical change and bring into
question the validity of many, and perhaps most, corporate charitable
deductions. 75 Furthermore, valuing the halo benefit could pose substantial
administrative complications. 76
This proposal would entail new administrative costs associated with
valuing the non-charitable advertising benefits, but advances in sports-
marketing theory and practice allow practitioners in the field to estimate the
commercial value of sponsorship arrangements based on the advertising
impressions generated. 77 Sports-marketing consultants can calculate the number
of times consumers see or hear a brand name, a logo, and a related message, and
based on the type and frequency of impressions, assign a monetary value. In
2001, Professors Ashley and O'Hara detailed the method of analyzing
advertising impressions to estimate the value of facility naming rights. 78 By
2006, major sports entities were gathering advertising impression figures to
"demonstrate the marketing effectiveness" of sponsorships as an advertising
medium. 79 In 2010, one consultant summarized the process stating, "The key to
determining [value] is figuring out just how many 'impressions' a sponsorship
will create-how many people saw it [and] how many times they saw it .... 80
In 2011, the chairman of a major U.S. corporation said "a sponsorship, whether
it's the NBA or the Redskins stadium or the... FedEx Orange Bowl, is the total
number of impressions." 81
Consultants analyze advertising impressions to estimate the value of
sponsorship arrangements for both buyers and sellers. 82 For example, Nielson
Ventures calculates advertising impressions and "evaluate[s] the effectiveness
of sponsor-placed media across multiple sports" 83 using a system called
Sponsorship Scorecard. In 2006, Nielson Ventures already was comparing the
effectiveness of sponsoring college football's Rose Bowl Game with NASCAR
7 4 See Knauer, supra note 9, at 4 ("[A] corporate transfer to charity is ... made with the
expectation of receiving a commensurate benefit in return.").
75 See id at 7 n.27; id. at 57-59 (noting that corporations usually seek a halo effect
when contributing to charity).
76 See infra Part III.C.1.
77 See, e.g., Ashley & O'Hara, supra note 23, at 18.
7 81d. at 19 (discussing the method for valuing naming rights for a convention center).
7 9 Nielsen Sports, supra note 24; see also Alm, supra note 24, at Cl ("The televised ad
impressions add up fast .... ).
8 0 Jim Harris, What's in a Name, ARK. Bus., Oct. 11, 2010, at 28, available at 2010
WLNR 21078353.
81 John Branston, Brand Awareness: Fred Smith Says FedEx and the NBA Are All
About Making Impressions, MEMPHIS FLYER, July 18, 2001, at 9, available at 2001 WLNR
9791431.
82 See, e.g., Nielsen Sports, supra note 24; see also Shore, supra note 24.
8 3 Nielsen Sports, supra note 24 ("Sponsorship ScorecardT enables clients to gauge
their return on investment (ROI) by matching impressions across different sports.").
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auto races, the U.S. Open tennis tournament, and the NFL Super Bowl. 84 In one
study, "[s]ponsors were ranked by average number of television impressions per
hour among viewers ages 25-54."85 One authority states that an advertising
message on radio is the equivalent of four impressions from a roadside
billboard. 86
Marketing experts are proficient in this area for practical reasons. Many
entities engage in selling sponsorships, such as professional sports teams
offering naming rights to new or renovated stadiums or professional sports
leagues selling sponsorships to playoffs or tournaments. These sellers are very
interested in maximizing revenue. Likewise, the commercial firms desiring to
buy advertising through sponsorships seek the expert counsel of sports
marketing consultants to avoid overpaying. 87 The appraisal procedures have
become so refined a stadium commission reports that, when multiple
consultants appraised a particular sponsorship opportunity, the estimates were
almost identical.8 8 Colleges and universities ask sports-marketing consultants to
estimate the market value of sponsorship rights before considering offers.
Rutgers hired two corporate agents to sell the naming rights to its football
stadium. 89 The University of Louisville and Boston College have each




86 Ashley & O'Hara, supra note 23, at 18; see also Chris Poynter, $40 Million May Be
High for Naming of New Arena, COURIER J., Sept. 11, 2005, at Al, available at 2005 WLNR
26774540 ("The industry standard is about a penny per impression." (quoting the president
of Front Row Marketing)).8 7 See infra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
8 8 Harris, supra note 80, at 28 ("AT&T had a Dallas firm calculate the value [and] the
stadium commission asked [Alan] Turner [of Turner Sponsorship Consultants] for his
assessment too. The numbers derived between the parties were within $2,000 of each other,
according to a report issued by the stadium commission.").
8 9 Conor Orr & Brendan Prunty, Scarlet Hoping to See Green by Selling Naming
Rights: Stadium, Athletic Center Being Offered as Pernetti Seeks Revenue for All Sports,
STAR-LEDGER, July 1, 2010, at 41, available at 2010 WLNR 13235553 (hiring Brooklyn
Sports & Entertainment and 1MG College).
90 McCafferty, supra note 33, at 51.
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2. Alternatives
There are many ways to tax, or exempt, these transactions. In contrast to
this Article's flexible, dual-character proposal, there are rigid, all-or-nothing
methods at both extremes. At one end of the spectrum, current law exempts
qualified sponsorship payments completely; at the other end, a 2009
Congressional Budget Office white paper would tax all college sponsorship
payments. Another possibility for situations posing challenging valuations
issues is a fixed-percentage approach.
a. Characterizing Sponsorship Payments Exclusively as Gifts
In 1997 Congress enacted I.R.C. § 513(i), 9 1 which allows all qualified
sponsorship payments to avoid the unrelated business income tax. This
exception is so broad that it practically eliminates the general rule that charities
must pay tax on their advertising income. 92 In a 2009 report, the Congressional
Budget Office flatly stated "qualified sponsorship payments ... provide...
advertising value to the sponsor." 93
Under I.R.C. § 513(i), qualified sponsorship payments include all payments
in exchange for displaying or publicizing any or all of the following: (i) the
payor's services or facilities; (ii) a listing of the payor's locations, telephone
numbers, or internet address; (iii) value-neutral descriptions, including displays
or visual depictions, of the payor's product lines or services; (iv) the payor's
brand or trade names and product or service listings; (v) the sponsor's logos and
slogans that do not contain qualitative or comparative descriptions of the
payor's products; and (vi) logos and slogans that are an established part of the
payor's identity (regardless of whether they contain qualitative or comparative
descriptions). 94 As a result of this final item, despite the general rule taxing
comparative ad revenues, 95 sponsorship payments for the KFC Yum! Center96
91 Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-34, § 965(a), 111 Stat. 893 (codified
as amended at I.R.C. § 513(i) (2006)).
92 Stone, supra note 13, at 220 ("On its face, [I.R.C. §] 513(c) appears to set the general
rule [that] advertising income is taxable-and Section 513(i) appears to define a limited
exception .... This appearance is deceptive. Section 513(i) effectively exempts almost all
advertising income, if we understand 'advertising' colloquially to mean posting a
commercial message for pay."). Current law would tax a commercial sponsorship payment
only if the messages contain qualitative language, price information, other indicators of
savings or value, or an endorsement. I.R.C. § 513(i)(2)(A) (2006). Also sponsorship
payments "contingent upon ... attendance, . . . broadcast ratings, or [otherwise on] the
degree of public exposure" are taxable. I.R.C. § 513(i)(2)(B)(i) (2006).9 3 CBO BUDGET OPTIONS, supra note 2, at 232.
94 Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(c)(2)(iv) (2002).
95S sR.C. § 513(i)(2)(A).96 See supra note 7 and accompanying text.
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at the University of Louisville and the Value City Arena 97 at The Ohio State
University can be tax exempt.
When enacted, the government indicated that the current rule would
distinguish between taxable advertising and tax-free acknowledgments.9 8 But as
one commentator asserts, "neither involves any element of gratuitous
altruism" 99 and "[i]n each case a business (the advertiser/sponsor) pays a charity
to transmit a commercially valuable message (an advertisement or sponsor
acknowledgment)." 100
b. Characterizing Sponsorships Exclusively as Taxable Ad Buys
At the other extreme, in 2009 the Congressional Budget Office prepared a
white paper titled Tax Preferences for Collegiate Sports10 1 and subsequently
estimated the tax revenue Congress could raise if it taxed all sponsorship
payments to postsecondary sports programs. 10 2 The CBO states that qualified
sponsorship payments "provide. .. advertising value to the sponsor," 10 3 and the
CBO report "would classify as [taxable] advertising revenue any money given
by a corporation to a college or university in exchange for naming rights to
postsecondary athletic events and facilities." 10 4 The CBO report lists several
advantages to this approach. 10 5
c. Discretionary "Substantial" Benefits Test
When first considering commercial sponsorships of college football in
1991,106 the IRS carefully analyzed and relied on existing authorities, but the
result was a highly discretionary approach that ignited a hostile response from
the charitable world. 10 7 Several features are noteworthy.
9 7 Schmadtke, supra note 3, at D1.
9 8 See Treas. Reg. § 1.513-4(c)(2)(iv) (2002) ("[A] substantial return benefit does not
include the use or acknowledgment of the name or logo ... .
99 Stone, supra note 13, at 225.
100/d.; see also id at 226 (concluding that true "acknowledgments," rather than
advertisements, are "rare in the real world" and occur only when the sponsor pays to be
"connected to the [charity]" but does not benefit from a "commercial communication[]" to
consumers).
101CONG. BUDGET OFFICE, TAX PREFERENCES FOR COLLEGIATE SPORTS (2009)
[hereinafter CBO WHITE PAPER], available at www.cbo.gov/publication/41172.
102 Id. at 232. Consistent with its normal practices the CBO did not officially endorse the




106 See IRS Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-31-001 (Oct. 22, 1991) (John Hancock Bowl); IRS
Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-47-007 (Aug. 16, 1991) (Mobile Cotton Bowl); supra note 44.
107 See Stone, supra note 13, at 223.
1368 [Vol. 73:6
2012] TAXING COMMERCIAL SPONSORSHIP OF COLLEGE ATHLETICS 1369
Initially the IRS considered John Hancock Life Insurance Company's
payments to sponsor a college football bowl game. 10 8 The IRS mentioned a
series of prior rulings indicating that the IRS would not treat public recognition
as a valuable return benefit, but the IRS stressed that in those situations the
donors received only limited recognition resulting in only insubstantial benefits
not "commensurate with the amount of the payment[s]." 10 9 In contrast, the IRS
stated that "a payment made with an expectation of a substantial return benefit
will be presumed ... not to be a contribution or gift."' 110
In applying this test, the IRS stated that it need look no further than the
written sponsorship agreement between the parties."' l The IRS reviewed
selected provisions of the John Hancock Life agreement and stated that those
provisions alone proved that the commercial sponsor was anticipating
substantial future benefits, and the entire amount paid constituted taxable
advertising revenue. 1 12 The ruling stated that all facts and circumstances were
relevant, and the approach suggested that IRS auditors and courts would have
great latitude in making factual decisions. The ruling contained no discussion of
the appropriate valuation techniques or procedures and offered no detailed
guidance on how to analyze the facts.
Later in 1991 the IRS employed the same test in a ruling involving the
Mobile Cotton Bowl, and again concluded that the written agreement
conclusively established that the publicity of the sponsor was a "substantial
benefit." 113
In January 1992 the IRS issued proposed audit guidelines1 14 that did little to
clarify the application of the test. The guidelines stated that a sponsor receives
substantial benefits if the charity "performs valuable advertising, marketing, and
similar services," and provided a nonexclusive list of four factors to consider. 115
10 8 IRS Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-31-001 (Oct. 22, 1991) (considering the 1987
arrangement); see also Stone, supra note 13, at 222 n.39 (identifying the game as the "John
Hancock Bowl").
10 9 IRS Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-31-001 (Oct. 22, 1991).
II 01d. (emphasis added); see also id. ("The appropriate way to answer this question is to
look at all the facts and circumstances to see if the payment was made with an expectation
of... a substantial return benefit." (emphasis added)).
I Id. ("[T]he agreement clearly shows that the sponsor's payment is commensurate in
value with the benefits the sponsor expects to receive .... "). Apparently the parties involved
argued that the IRS's reliance on the contract was excessive.
112 1d. The IRS described the advertising services for John Hancock Life Insurance
under the Sponsorship Agreement. John Hancock Life Insurance could "design the game's
name and logo," and the logo would appear on promotional materials, the players' uniforms,
and on the field. [TV] [v]iewers would see the sponsor's name "about 60 times
during... the [g]ame... and... hear the.., sponsor's name about 50 times during
the ... [g]ame." Id.
13 IRS Tech. Adv. Mem. 91-47-007 (Nov. 22, 1991); see also Stone, supra note 13, at
222 n.39 (identifying the game as the "Mobile Cotton Bowl").
1 41RS Ann. 92-15, 1992-5 I.R.B. 51 (Jan. 17, 1992), available at 1992 WL 786303.
115 Id. ("A determination of whether a substantial return benefit is present should include
an analysis of: the value of the service provided ... ; the terms ... ; the amount of control
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Perhaps in an attempt to relieve the anxiety for a fraction of the charitable
sector, the IRS stated that "[a]s a matter of audit tolerance" volunteer
organizations "that are ... purely local" with "relatively insignificant gross
revenue[s] from corporate sponsors" would not be challenged on audit.1 16 The
IRS anticipated this safe-harbor would exempt "local theatres and youth
orchestras," and "youth athletic organizations such as little league baseball and
soccer teams."1 17 The government reneged on this promise of audit leniency for
small volunteer organizations in January 1993118 and made additional
modifications in proposed regulations,1 19 but apparently the changes were
insufficient to assuage the concerns of charitable organizations.
Faced with this vague, discretionary test likely to produce unpredictable
results, the charitable sector sought relief. In 1997, Congress adopted I.R.C.
§ 513(i), which makes sponsorship revenue tax-free as long as the parties
comply with certain guidelines. 120 In its defense, in 1991 the IRS was
attempting to deal with these complex arrangements before the development of
widespread valuation expertise in the sports-marketing field. 12 1
d. Fixed-Percentage Approach
In two situations involving complex valuation issues, the government has
adopted a fixed-percentage approach. 122 This approach can avoid the cost of
appraisals and valuation disputes, but is problematic when circumstances vary
significantly from case to case.
that the sponsor exercises over the event; and whether the extent of the organization's
exposure of the donor's name constitutes significant promotion.").
116 Id
11858 Fed. Reg. 5687-02 (Jan. 22, 1993), reprinted in 1993-7 I.R.B. 71 (preamble to
Prop. Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-i) ("The proposed regulations... apply uniformly to all
sponsorship activities without regard to the local nature of the organization or activities or
the amount of the sponsorship payment.").
119 Id
120 See supra Part II.
121 See supra notes 77 90 and accompanying text; see also BURTON, supra note 63, at
49 ("Since the mid-1990s, there has been a groundswell of naming rights activity.");
ANDREW ZIMBALIST, UNPAID PROFESSIONALS: COMMERCIALISM AND CONFLICT IN BIG-TIME
COLLEGE SPORTS 4 (1999) ("[C]orporate sponsorships ... increased roughly sevenfold in the
nineties ....").
122 In one situation, the IRS entered into a settlement agreement with the Church of
Scientology allowing the Church members to deduct eighty percent of the fees they pay to
the Church for auditing and training services, provided that the Church members do not
deduct the remaining twenty percent. See Sklar v. Comm'r, 125 T.C. 281, 298-99 (2005),
quoted in Wendy C. Gerzog, From the Greedy to the Needy, 87 OR. L. REV. 1] 33, 1135 n.5
(2008); see also Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680 (1989) (illustrating that although the
IRS won the Hernandez case, the IRS subsequently entered into the settlement agreement
allowing Church members to deduct eighty percent).
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For example, the government faced potential valuation issues involving
college alumni who paid to acquire the rights to purchase tickets to college
sporting events. In Revenue Ruling 86-63,123 multiple universities required
alumni to annually contribute at least $300 to an athletic scholarship program in
order to have the right to buy tickets for football or basketball games. Initially,
the IRS stated that the results would depend on the facts of each situation. For
example, if a college's games always sell out, the IRS concluded that the
payments to the scholarship funds are not charitable contributions at all, but
instead are disguised payments for tickets, and therefore the alumni cannot
deduct any part of the payment as a charitable contribution. 124 The IRS
considered another situation in which the college's games never sold out, and
there was no benefit gained by making the payments to the scholarship fund. In
this situation, the IRS concluded that the payments to the scholarship fund were
tax-deductible charitable gifts. 125
Two years later, however, Congress enacted I.R.C. § 170(/),126 which
replaces this facts-and-circumstances approach with a fixed-percentage
approach to avoid valuation disputes with individual taxpayers. 127 The new
statute declares that alumni can deduct eighty percent of these payments as
charitable contributions, but cannot deduct the remaining twenty percent.
This example demonstrates both the strength and the weakness of a fixed-
percentage approach. On the one hand, it is administratively easy for the
colleges and the alumni to apply, and disputes are unlikely. As of January 2012,
there were no reported cases involving I.R.C. § 170(l).128 On the other hand, the
fixed-percentage approach may allow alumni of colleges with popular athletic
programs to deduct eighty percent of disguised payments for entertainment. For
example, alumni of football-powerhouse Oklahoma State University paid
$2,500 for the right to purchase football tickets 129 and presumably deducted
123 Rev. Rul. 86-63, 1986-1 C.B. 88.
124 Id. at 89 ("Unless the taxpayer can establish that $300 exceeded the value of the
benefit received, no part of the $300 payment is a charitable contribution.").
12 51d. (situation 3).
126 1.R.C. § 170() (2006) (originally enacted by the Technical and Miscellaneous
Revenue Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-647, § 6001(a), 102 Stat. 3342).
12 7 H.R. REP. No. 100-795, at 523 (1988).
128A Westlaw search of the "Federal Taxation-Cases (FTX-CS)" database using
"170()" found no entries on June 30, 2012. See also Barbara L. Kirschten & Carla Neeley
Freitag, Charitable Contributions: Income Tax Aspects, TAX MGM'T PORTFOLIO (BNA) No.
521-3rd, at A-53 (citing no cases involving I.R.C. § 170(/) and only one IRS Technical
Advice Memorandum).12 9 See Will, Tax, supra note 26, at A17. Although I.R.C. §170() provides in part that
"[i]f any portion of a payment is for the purchase of... tickets, such portion ... shall be
treated as separate amounts" and would not be tax deductible, there have been no reported
cases involving I.R.C. § 170(1). See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
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eighty percent of those payments. Professor Colombo calls the twenty percent
figure "arbitrary."' 130
Current law arguably employs a fixed-percentage approach to corporate
sponsorship payments; the law treats zero percent of the payments as taxable
advertising revenue. 131 A fixed-percentage approach treating at least some
portion of commercial sponsorship payments as taxable advertising revenue
might be closer to the economic substance in some situations, but in light of the
factual differences between arrangements, 132 any fixed-percentage approach
would fail to match economic reality in many situations.
B. The Case for the Balanced Proposal
1. Balancing Education and Athletics on Campus
One of Congress's rationales for enacting the UBIT was that if unrelated
activities were not taxed, charities would "allocate an excessive amount of
resources" to unrelated activities to the detriment of their core missions. 133
Colleges are multifaceted institutions typically emphasizing education, research,
and athletics. 134 The tax law clearly recognizes that the first two endeavors are
worthy of tax exemption and donors can deduct contributions; 135 the case for
athletics is murky. Generally, recreational activities are neither charitable nor
eligible to receive tax-deductible contributions. 136 Nevertheless, historically the
130 John D. Colombo, The Marketing of Philanthropy and the Charitable Contributions
Deduction: Integrating Theories for the Deduction and Tax Exemption, 36 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 657, 663 n.23 (2001).
131 See supra Part III.A.2.a.
132 See supra notes 3-9 and accompanying text.
13 3 CBO WHITE PAPER, supra note 101, at 2 ("Policymakers at that time
were ... concerned that [in the absence of the UBIT, charities would] allocate an excessive
amount of resources to those activities rather than to their charitable purpose."); see also
H.R. REP. No. 81-2319, at 37 (1950).
134See, e.g., Kevin Johnson & Kelly Whiteside, Penn State Rethinks Emphasis on
Football, USA TODAY (Dec. 7, 2011), http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/sports/college
/football/bigten/story/2011-12-06/penn-state-rodney-erickson-interview-football-
emphasis/51686080/1. ("Penn State President Rodney Erickson [said] that he is seeking to
transform the university's public image from a football school to a 'world class research
institution."').
135 See I.R.C. § 1 70(c)(2)(B) (2006) (contributions to qualified educational or scientific
organizations are tax deductible); I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006) (organizations organized and
operated exclusively for educational or scientific purposes are eligible for tax exemption);
see also BRUCE R. HOPKINS, THE LAW OF TAX-EXEMPT ORGANIZATIONS 288 91 (9th ed.
2007) (fundamental or basic research is "scientific" for these purposes).
136 See St. Louis Sci. Fiction Ltd. v. Comm'r, 49 T.C.M. (CCH) 1126, 1129 (1985)
(despite engaging in certain educational activities, the court denied the organization tax
exemption under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) because the "social and recreational purposes constituted
a substantial portion of [the organization's] activities"); Minn. Kingsmen Chess Ass'n, Inc.
v. Comm'r, 46 T.C.M. (CCH) 1133, 1135 (1983) (chess club was not an "educational"
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tax law has treated some nonprofit athletic organizations as tax-exempt
educational or charitable organizations under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3), 137 and has
treated college athletic programs as an integral part of the tax-exempt
college.138
An old axiom asserts that if you want less of something, tax it; if you want
more of something, refrain from taxing it. 139 Current tax law provides the same
economic incentive for a college to play sports as to educate its students. If
many believe that colleges should emphasize education over sports,1 40 and taxes
impact behavior, one would expect controversies over the role of sports on
campus. Many current debates confirm these concerns. 14 1
For example, numerous commentators complain about the compensation of
college football and basketball coaches, 142 particularly when compared to the
pay of university presidents and chancellors. Some coaches earn almost ten
organization under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) because "[t]he presence of a single noneducational
purpose, if substantial in nature, will make the organization ineligible.., regardless of the
number or importance of truly educational purposes ... [and] we find that the [chess]
matches were more recreational in nature than educational"). But see I.R.C. § 501(c)(7)
(2006) (a portion of a country club's income is tax exempt under certain circumstances).
13 7 See e.g., Hutchinson Baseball Enters., Inc. v. Comm'r, 73 T.C. 144 (1979) (an adult
baseball team competing against semi-pro teams is a charitable organization), aff'd, 696 F.2d
757 (10th Cir. 1982); Lions Assoc. Drag Strip v. United States, 64-1 U.S.T.C. (CCH) 9283
(S.D. Cal. 1963) (a drag racing club is an educational organization); Rev. Rul. 64-275, 1964-
2 C.B. 142 (the sponsor of multiday seminars for aspiring yachtsmen is an educational
organization). Also an organization fostering national or international amateur sports
competition will be exempt if it meets various conditions. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (2006).
138See, e.g., Rev. Rul. 80-295, 1980-2 C.B. 194; Rev. Rul. 80-296, 1980-2 C.B. 195;
see also Colombo, supra note 26, at 132 ("[T]he IRS has consistently ruled over many
decades that college athletics are ... functionally related to educational programs of
universities."); id. at 141-42.
13 9 Jeffrey L. Yablon, As Certain as Death Quotations About Taxes (2006 edition), 110
TAX NOTES 103, 108 (2006) ("If you want more of something, subsidize it; ifyou want less,
tax it."); see also id. at 139 ("Every tax exemption constitutes a subsidy." (quoting Justice
William J. Brennan Jr.)).
140 See, e.g., Johnson & Whiteside, supra note 134.
141 See RONALD A. SMITH, PAY FOR PLAY: A HISTORY OF BIG-TIME COLLEGE ATHLETIC
REFORM, at ix (2011) ("The harmony sought by the balance of yin and yang of college
athletics has been an elusive feature of big-time athletics."); Branch, supra note 1, at 86
("[R]eformers fret[] that commercialism [is] hurting college sports ....").
142 See, e.g., Steve Berkowitz & Jodi Upton, College Football's New Hires in Money,
USA TODAY, Jan. 17, 2012, at IA ("[A]verage basic compensation.., will go... to a little
more than $1.5 million next season .... This just shows ... the difficulty of bringing
[football] into the right proportion, the right balance with the academic mission." (quoting in
part John Nichols, Penn State Professor Emeritus)); James K. Gentry & Raquel Meyer
Alexander, From the Sideline to the Bottom Line, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 31, 2011,
http://www.nytimes.com/212/01/0 /sports/ncaafootball/contracts-for-top-college-football-
coaches-grow-complicated.html?pagewanted-all.
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times more than the university's top academic officials. 143 Since 1984, the
average compensation for head football coaches at public universities has
grown 750% (adjusted for inflation), compared to just 32% for college
professors over the same time. 144
Also, commentators describe spending for athletic facilities and equipment
as an "arms race." 145 Elite sports programs feel compelled to match or surpass
their rivals in weight room facilities, luxury boxes, and other amenities. For
example, the University of Michigan reportedly expanded their 107,000 seat
football stadium to keep up with Big Ten rival The Ohio State University. 146
"[A]thletic expenditures are rising three or four times faster than expenditures in
academic programs .... 147
In 2010-2011 alone, high-profile scandals rocked numerous prestigious
institutions, including the University of Southern California, The Ohio State
University, and the University of North Carolina. 148 A headline proclaimed,
"College Football Faces Scandals of Every Stripe."'149 In each case, "[c]ritics
scold [ed] schools for breaking faith with their educational mission." 150
In discussing balance on campus, even the NCAA President remarked,
"[y]ou shouldn't have the light of the academic side hidden under the bushel
14 3 See George Will, Modern College Football Is Impervious to Reform, DESERET NEWS,
Nov. 10, 2011, at A17, available at 2011 WLNR 23261384 (illuminating that at the
University of Alabama, head football coach Nick Saban's salary is $4.6 million and the
University president's salary is $487,620; at Louisiana State University, head football coach
Les Miles's salary is $3.75 million and the University chancellor's salary is $400,000). In
2011, the highest paid football coach was Mac Brown of the University of Texas, receiving
$5,193,500; the highest paid basketball coach was Louisville University's Rick Pitino,
receiving $7,531,378; and the highest paid public-college president in 2009 2010 was Ohio
State's Gordon Gee, receiving $1.3 million. Steve Wieberg, College Coaches and Power:
How Much Is Too Much?, USA TODAY, Dec. 29, 2011, http://usatoday30.usatoday.com/
NEWS/usaedition/2012-01-17-College-football-coach-compensation-changes ST U.htm.144 Branch, supra note 1, at 93 (discussing the research of Charles Clotfelter, an
economist at Duke University; also noting that the average compensation of a head football
coach at a public university is $2 million); see also Wieberg, supra note 143, at 4C
("Whatever restraint is sought in college athletics, it doesn't extend to coaches' salaries.").
14 5 See, e.g, Colombo, supra note 26, at 157.
146 Chengelis, supra note 33, at IC; McCafferty, supra note 33, at 48; see also Will,
supra note 143, at A17 ("A few millennia from now.., archeologists ... will wonder why a
109,901 -seat entertainment venue was attached to an institution of higher education.").
147 Katie Thomas, A Call to Reduce Universities' Athletic Spending Strikes Some as
Unrealistic, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 27, 2009, at B16, available at www.nytimes.com/2009/10/27/
sports/ncaafootball/27ncaa.html (quoting William E. Kirwan, chancellor of Maryland's
university system).14 8 See Branch, supra note 1, at 82; Pete Thamel, College Football's Ugly Season,
Facing Scandals of Every Stripe, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 21, 2011, at 1 ("[A]t least 10 major
college football programs including those at institutions esteemed for academics, like
Michigan, North Carolina and Georgia Tech-have been investigated or punished by the
NCAA in recent months.").14 9 Thamel, supra note 148, at 1.
150 Branch, supra note 1, at 82.
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basket of football. 1 51 In 2010 a "single college athletic league [consisting of
twelve schools], the football-crazed Southeastern Conference (SEC), became
the first to crack the billion-dollar barrier in athletic receipts." 152 Unfortunately,
contentious issues about balancing athletics and academics cannot be resolved
by modeling programs after overseas college athletic departments. "The United
States is the only country in the world that hosts big-time sports at institutions
of higher learning." 153
2. Equal Treatmentfor Similar Activities, and Economic Substance
A bedrock of sound taxation is horizontal equity; the law should tax
similarly situated taxpayers the same. 154 Current law on this topic violates the
principle because commercial sponsorship of college sports is similar to
advertising for professional sports, 155 but the former is tax-free and the latter is
taxable. In 1991, the IRS cited with approval the following assertions:
"[S]ponsorship... has pervaded many sports events including bass fishing,
beach volleyball, bowling, college football (bowls), golf (both L.P.G.A. and
P.G.A.), marathons, squash, steeplechase, and tennis .... Thus, the popularity
of... [sports] sponsorship is enormous."1 56 At the time, "[s]ports sponsorship
[was] a three billion dollar industry, with almost 4,200 companies sponsoring
sports events." 157 By 1999, North American corporations were investing over
$7 billion in sports sponsorships. 158 By 2011, the figure climbed to over $18
billion.159
The Congressional Budget Office makes a disturbing allegation about
current law's inequitable treatment. The CBO states that "[c]orporations that
purchase naming rights to college football bowl games ... effectively pay less
15 1 Kelly Whiteside & Kevin Johnson, NCAA 's Mark Emmert Happy with Penn State's
"Forthrightness," USA TODAY, Dec. 7, 2011, www.usatoday.com/sports/college/football
/bigten/story/2011 -12-06/ncaa-president-mark-emmert-penn-state-scandal/51686768/ 1.
152 Branch, supra note 1, at 82.
153 Id
15 4 See supra note 17 and accompanying text.
155Colombo, supra note 26, at 150 ("Big-time college athletics revenues ... are
absolutely no different from... [those] same revenues flowing to professional, for-profit
sports.").
156 1RS Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-31-001 (Oct. 22, 1991); see also N. R. Kleinfield,
Marketers Exploit Second-Tier Sports, N.Y. TIMES, May 19, 1991, at F-5, col. 1 (examining
the impact of sponsorship of steeplechase).
15 7 IRS Tech. Adv. Mem. 92-31-001 (Oct. 22, 1991).
15 8 Robert Madrigal, The Influence of Social Alliances iith Sports Teams on Intentions
to Purchase Corporate Sponsors' Products, 29 J. ADVERTISING 13, 13 (2000).
159Dave Kovaleski, Association Sponsorships Grow, but at a Below-Average Rate,
ASS'N MEETINGS, Feb. 2012, at 9, available at 2012 WLNR 2282372 ("Overall,
corporations doled out $18.1 billion in sponsorships last year in North America."); id.
(noting that "sports events" is "[t]he largest category ... get[ting] 69 percent of corporate
sponsorships").
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for advertising than they would to purchase similar services from a for-profit
organization,"' 160 and as a result "a considerable portion of the subsidy the tax
code provides ... [is] passed on to [for-profit] purchasers of advertising."' 16 1
The CBO's claim may be correct if commercial sponsors refuse to pay fair-
market rates to colleges and demand that colleges charge below-market rates
and pass along part of the tax savings to the commercial sponsors. In the
absence of empirical evidence, this claim is interesting but subject to potential
challenge. 162
3. Revenue Raising and Preventing Accounting Machinations
A cardinal goal of the U.S. tax system is raising revenue for public goods
such as national defense. 163 Accordingly, if a new revenue-raising tax satisfies
other tax policy goals, it contributes to the welfare of the nation.
In 2009, the Congressional Budget Office stated that qualified sponsorship
payments total $275 million a year,164 but the CBO concluded that taxing the
net income from these arrangements "would be unlikely to ... garner much tax
revenue," 16 5 only about $20 million each year.1 66 The CBO report presents no
expense calculations, and states "[t]here are no rules or ... standard practices
delineating how schools divide revenue[s and costs] ... between the athletic
department and the [rest of the] university." 167 The CBO states that colleges
''would have a substantial incentive to shift costs from the untaxed portion of
the university to the taxable portion and to shift income in the other
direction" 168 and notes "increased costs would reduce or eliminate taxable net
income for the athletic program." 169 The CBO acknowledges that the low tax-
revenue projection results more from the accounting manipulations than the true
economic situation. 170 Perhaps even more pessimistic, the CBO forecasts that a
160 CBO BUDGET OPTIONS, supra note 2, at 232.
161 Id.
162 For example, perhaps colleges feel no compulsion to charge cheaper rates than other
advertising sellers and are content to compete with other advertising sellers on features other
than price. Indeed, actual practice indicates that at least sometimes charities charge premium
rates, see supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text, perhaps because of the extra cachet from
affiliating with a prestigious educational institution. See Knauer, supra note 9, at 7 n.27
(discussing the "halo effect").
16 3 MALMAN, supra note 15, at 8 ("Revenue is the primary goal of taxation.").
164 CBO BUDGET OPTIONS, supra note 2, at 232.
165 CBO WHITE PAPER, supra note 101, at viii.
166 CBO BUDGET OPTIONS, supra note 2, at 232.
167 CBO WHITE PAPER, supra note 101, at 7.
1681d. at 12.
169 Id.
170 1d. at 7 (although many schools in the elite Division IA category report net deficits
from their sports programs, this "more likely ... reflect[s] the conceptual difficulties in
measuring income rather than a statement about the true underlying profitability of those
programs").
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college anticipating a tax bill for a particular year would pay its sponsorship
profits out to the football coach as extra compensation to obtain a tax deduction
and thereby evade the tax.17 1 This is particularly disturbing because it
anticipates that a tax-exempt educational institution would rather pay its
football coach an extra dollar than pay thirty-five cents in tax and use the
remaining sixty-five cents to educate its students. 172
Professor Colombo shares the CBO's accounting pessimism. Professor
Colombo states, "[I]f the IRS applie[s] the UBIT to individual football or
basketball program revenues (either at the NCAA or university level), it would
find no net profit from these programs to tax after factoring in depreciation on
athletic facilities and a reasonable apportionment of overhead."1 73 Professor
Colombo observes, "[C]harities in general have shown remarkable ability to
'zero out' any net income [tax] from unrelated business activities."1 74
This accounting pessimism appears based on an assumption that the college
can deduct net expenses from playing the sport against the commercial
sponsorship revenue. This notion is evident in the 1993 IRS proposed
regulations on commercial sponsorships, which concluded that the revenue
from selling T-shirts and other apparel featuring the name and logo of a bowl
game could be offset by the college's net expenses from playing the bowl game
"[b]ecause the unrelated income exploits the bowl game."1 75
In contrast to the CBO Report and the 1993 IRS proposed regulations,
under this Article's proposal, colleges could not offset expenses from the
exempt activity of playing the game against the unrelated commercial
sponsorship payments. 176 Instead, the college would deduct only the expenses
directly connected with selling and providing the advertising services to the
commercial sponsor. The proposal is consistent with current I.R.C. § 513(c) in
fragmenting the unrelated activity from the educational activities, and follows a
different example in the proposed treasury regulations in which a college leases
its stadium to a professional football team for certain events. 177 This example
states the lease is not related to the college's exempt purposes and "does not
exploit the bowl game," and therefore "expenses, depreciation, and similar
items paid ... in conducting the bowl game may not be [deducted] in
17 1 Id. at 12.
172 The maximum tax rate on a charity's unrelated business income is thirty-five percent
for 2012. See I.R.C. § 511 (a)(1) (2006) (referring to the tax rates under I.R.C. § 11).
17 3 Colombo, supra note 26, at 144-45.
174Id. at 144.
175Taxation of Tax-Exempt Organizations' Income from Corporate Sponsorship, 58
Fed. Reg. 5687, 5689 (proposed Jan. 22, 1993) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (proposed
Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-1(e) ex. 2).
176 See infra Appendix (§ 513(i)(2) of the proposed statute).
177Taxation of Tax-Exempt Organizations' Income from Corporate Sponsorship, 58
Fed. Reg. 5687, 5689 (proposed Jan. 22, 1993) (to be codified at 26 C.F.R. pt. 1) (proposed
Treas. Reg. § 1.512(a)-l(e) ex. 3).
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computing unrelated business taxable income attributable to the lease." 1 7 8 The
U.S. Supreme Court has held that the calculation of income for tax purposes
need not follow generally accepted accounting principles,1 7 9 and this Article's
proposal could raise significant tax revenues.
4. Shifting Dollars from Campus to Government
The proposal would shift dollars from campus to government.
Theoretically, if both the college and the government spend their dollars on
meritorious projects benefiting society generally, the impact of the tax appears
to be a wash for society. The tax could even harm society if the government
wastes the extra tax revenue, or simply does not use it as wisely as the colleges.
But in reality this revenue shifting can have societal benefits. Several
commentators assert or imply that large portions of college football and
basketball revenues simply are plowed back into the football and basketball
programs, escalating the "arms race" 180 between competing colleges resulting in
even higher coaches' salaries and more luxury boxes. 181 Professor Colombo has
called for greater information reporting to test the claims of some football and
basketball programs that they support minor sports like track and field and
rowing. 182 If colleges do not use excess athletic revenues virtuously, taxing that
excess may provide net societal benefits.
A related concern is that the tax will reduce the prominence of schools with
big-time athletic programs. In support of athletics, some emphasize the "Flutie
Factor." 183 The success of Boston College's football team with Doug Flutie at
quarterback from 1981 to 1984 significantly increased student applications to
Boston College, 184 and perhaps the school's "academic stature."1 85 The Flutie
Factor posits that what is good for a school's sports teams is good for the
school. While the Flutie Factor can give an individual college a boost, former
17 8 1d.
179 Thor Power Tool Co. v. Comm'r., 439 U.S. 522, 540 (1979).
180 Colombo, supra note 26, at 157.
181 See id (discussing the 2001 Knight Commission report's emphasis on the "arms-
race" nature of big-time college athletics).
18 2 See id at 156.
18 3 See William E. Thro, Review of Murray Sperber's Beer and Circus: How Big-Time
College Sports is Crippling Undergraduate Education, 28 J.C. & U.L. 233, 237 n.15 (2001).
184 James J. Hefferan, Jr., Taking One for the Team: Davidson v. University of North
Carolina and the Duty of Care Oiied by Universities to Their Student-Athletes, 37 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 589, 605 (2002) ("[A]dmissions applications [rose] at Boston College from
5000 to 16,000 in the year after Doug Flutie won the Heisman Trophy and completed the
now-famous 'Hail Mary' pass.
185 Timothy Liam Epstein, Splinters from the Bench: Feasibility of Lawsuits by Athletes
Against Coaches and Schools for Lack of Playing Time, 4 VA. SPORTS & ENT. L.J. 174, 181
n.36 (2005) (citing MURRAY SPERBER, BEER AND CIRCUS: How BIG-TIME COLLEGE SPORTS
IS CRIPPLING UNDERGRADUATE EDUCATION 60 68 (2000)); see also Will, supra note 143, at
A17 (speculating that "athletic successes [may] cause increased ... alumni giving").
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Congressman Bill Thomas and others question whether there is any net gain for
charities in total. 186 In other words, if more students apply for admission to
Boston College because of the success of the football team, are fewer students
applying at schools with declining football or basketball programs, resulting in
no net increase in students enrolling in college?
5. Clarifying the Debates on Athletics and Commercialism
This Article proposes taxing one feature of commercialism on campus, but
many ponder commercialism in general. 187 They ask whether the schools are
"selling out" 1 88 and whether "commercialization ... undermin[es] the academic
integrity and educational values at America's institutions of higher learning."' 189
A Maryland State Senator "introduced a bill that would have forbidden state
schools from [entering into] corporate naming-rights deals."'190
"In 2001, the Knight Commission on Intercollegiate Athletics, a watchdog
group, began railing about the over-commercialization of college
athletics ... [including] increased corporate advertisements and logos . . .191
In a 2009 Knight Commission survey, ninety-five college presidents replied that
they "are very worried about the commercialization of intercollegiate
athletics."' 192 The co-chair of the Knight Commission remarked, "athletic[]
expenditures are rising three or four times faster than expenditures in academic
programs."1 93 Despite the concerns of individual college presidents, many were
quick to add that they would not be willing to unilaterally reduce
commercialism at their home institution for fear of the reaction of alumni and
trustees, and the impact on revenues. 194
18 6 See Will, Tax, supra note 26, at A17 ("[F]ederal taxpayers have no interest in
increasing applicant pools at one school opposed to another." (quoting Congressman
Thomas)).
187 Schmadtke, supra note 3, at D1 ("[C]ollege athletics frequently finds itself awash in
debates about commercialism ....").
188 Id. ("[M]any people are ... concerned with this notion of 'selling out."').
189Frank G. Splitt, Are Big-Time College Sports Good for America?, THE DRAKE
GROUP (2006), http://thedrakegroup.org/Splitt Good for America.pdf.
190 Schmadtke, supra note 3, at D1 (noting that the senator introduced the bill in 1998,
but it never passed, and the University of Maryland signed a naming rights deal with
Comcast two years later).
191 1d; see also Alan Schmadtke, Monied Madness: Too Mitch Marketing, Too Mitch
Commercialization and Too Mich Money Plague College Athletics Today, ORLANDO
SENTINEL, Mar. 10, 2002, at G1, G4, available at 2002 WLNR 12832553 ("We aren't
keeping athletics in their proper role within the institution .... Athletics is taking on a life of
its own. And the pressure [is] so great that the fundamental integrity of our institutions is
being challenged." (quoting former Florida Board of Regents chairman Adam Herbert)).
192 Thomas, supra note 147, at B 16.
19 3 Id. (quoting William E. Kirwan, chancellor of Maryland's university system).
194Id.
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The tax issue can obscure these broader controversies; 195 correcting the tax
treatment may help clarify the debates.
C. Implementing the Balanced Proposal
1. Valuation with the Focus on Non-Charitable Ad Impressions
College athletic sponsorships are more complex to appraise than other types
of advertising because there are at least four different elements of value. First is
the value from the simple appearance and repetition of the name, logo, image or
message. This element is present with even the most mundane image or
commercial on a highway billboard, on the side of a bus, in a newspaper or
magazine, or on radio or TV. 196 "[These] are direct purchases of time and
opportunities where [the] exposure and the impressions are reliable and priced
accordingly." 197 Second is the value from affiliation with sports. Some
corporations especially desire an association with a sports team or event
because the team or event may build a sense of local pride and kinship. 198 This
benefit is available from sponsoring a professional team's stadium as a well as a
college team's facility. Third, corporations may particularly value connecting
their brand with a winner in order to be associated with success and other traits
valued by society.199 Fourth, affiliation of a sponsor's brand with a prestigious
educational institution could add extra cachet for which a corporation may pay a
premium.2 00
19 5 See, e.g., ZIMBALIST, supra note 121, at 5 (railing against commercialism, the author
notes "the NCAA and its member schools.., do not pay taxes on their millions from TV
deals, [and] sponsorships"); see also Splitt, supra note 189 ("[T]he NCAA exploits college
athletes while making huge amounts of tax-exempt money under the guise of an institution
of higher education.").
196 PHIL SCHAAF, SPORTS, INC.: 100 YEARS OF SPORTS BUSINESS 173 (2004) ("Several
forms of sponsorship manifest in media impressions ... such as radio, television, and
outdoor billboards and print.").
197/ I.
19 8 See Madrigal, supra note 158, at 13 ("[F]avorable purchase intentions are more
likely to occur (1) as identification with the team increases and (2) when such intentions are
perceived as a group norm.").
19 9 See Mike Colias, Buick Bets Big on March Madness Marketing, AUTOMOTIVE NEWS,
Mar. 21, 2011, at 16, available at 2011 WLNR 5787868 ("If [there were] a brand that
enables and inspires and celebrates human achievement, boy, that's March Madness at its
core .... " (quoting Chris Perry, General Motors head of U.S. marketing)); Branch, supra
note 1, at 82 ("[C]orporations offer money so they can profit from the glory of college
athletes .... "); Madrigal, supra note 158, at 13 ("[S]ome of the cognitive associations or
personal meanings people hold toward the property (e.g., fun, youthful, exciting, excellence)
may become linked in memory to the brand .... In the case of sports sponsorship, a
particularly relevant secondary association is the social alliance existing between a fan and
the property.").
200 Knauer, supra note 9, at 4, 57 59.
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This Article's proposal would tax only the amount paid for the first element
of value, the simple repetition of the name, logo, image, message, or other
identifier. 20 1 The proposal would treat any excess as a tax-free charitable gift.
This streamlined approach has multiple benefits. First, appraisals should be
simpler because the appraiser need not consider the extra prestige from
associating with sports, winners, or colleges. Second, the traditional rule that
corporations may enjoy a halo effect from a charitable contribution without
adverse tax consequences would continue .202 Third, the proposal may avoid the
fiery criticism drawn with the all-or-nothing approaches of the past,20 3 and the
competing factions may view this as a reasonable compromise.
2. Procedures for Valuation and Information Reporting to the IRS
In designing and implementing this new approach, procedures from at least
three other areas of the tax law may assist. All three address potentially
challenging valuation situations.
First, under the rules for noncash charitable contributions, 20 4 if a donor
contributes property such as real estate, art work, gemstones, antiques, or
memorabilia, the donor generally may deduct an amount equal to the fair
market value of the property.20 5 in this scenario, if the deduction exceeds
$5,000,206 typically the tax law requires that the donor obtain a qualified
appraisal 20 7 from a disinterested appraiser, 20 8 complete and file a separate tax
form with the IRS, 209 attach an appraisal summary to the tax return,2 10 and
obtain the charity's signature verifying that the charity received the property. 2 11
The charity need not agree with the claimed valuation of the property. 2 12 Thus,
in the case of noncash charitable contributions, the party having the greatest
interest in the value (the donor) obtains the appraisal, the party with less
201 See infra Appendix (proposed § 513(i)(1)).
202 See Knauer, supra note 9, at 57 59.
20 3 See Stone, supra note 13, at 223.
204 See Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(c) (1984).
20 51d. § 1.170-1(c)(1) ("If a [charitable] contribution is made in property other than
money, the amount of the [contribution] is the fair market value of the property at the time of
the contribution."). But see I.R.C. § 170(e)(1) (2006) (limiting the deduction to the
taxpayer's basis in the property under certain circumstances).206 See IRS Form 8283 (revised Dec. 2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/f8283.pdf.20 7 Treas. Reg. § 1.1 70A- I 3(c)(2)(A) (1984).
20 81d. § 1.170A-13(c)(5) (defining "qualified appraiser").
20 9 See IRS Form 8283 (revised Dec. 2006), available at http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-
pdf/f8283.pdf.2 10 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(c)(2)(B) (1984).
2111d. § 1.170A-13(c)(4)(iii).
2 12 1d. ("The signature of the donee on the appraisal summary does not represent
concurrence in the appraised value of the contributed property.").
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concern over the valuation (the charity) need not endorse the valuation, and the
donor must disclose detailed information to the IRS.
Second, under the quid pro quo rules, if a donor contributes cash or
property and the charity provides goods or services in return, the donor can
deduct only the portion of the payment in excess of the fair market value of the
goods or services the charity provides.2 13 In this situation, although the donor
has the greatest interest in the valuation, the tax rules specify that the charity
determines the value of the property or other benefits the charity provides to the
donor,2 14 and the donor must follow the charity's valuation unless it is
"unreasonable." 2 15 The charity must provide the donor with a written statement
of the value of the goods or services provided, 2 16 but the charity need not obtain
an appraisal or file an appraisal summary with the IRS.2 1 7
Third, on the sale of the assets of a business, if the buyer and seller agree in
writing on the allocation of the purchase price, or on the fair market value of
any asset,2 18 they must each attach IRS Form 8594 to their respective tax
return.2 19 The IRS Form 8594 anticipates setting forth the value of the assets in
various classes, and the buyer and seller are bound by the agreed value. 220 The
tax rules do not require that either party obtain an appraisal from a qualified
appraiser, do not specify whether the buyer or seller should initiate the valuation
process, but provide for detailed information reporting to the IRS.
The procedures for this Article's proposal borrow established methods to
promote accuracy and minimize administrative burdens. Consistent with the
noncash-charitable-donation rules, 22 1 the proposal would require a qualified
appraisal because the situation creates an incentive for abuse,2 22 and expertise is
needed to accurately value the rights or services. Although either the corporate
sponsor or the charity could obtain the appraisal because both might arrange for
a professional valuation before actually entering into a binding contract, there
may be situations when the college merely relies upon the fifty-percent rule of
thumb or a similar approach. 223 Following the rules when a donor receives
goods or services in return for a donation, 224 the initial valuation likely should
213United States v. Am. Bar Endowment, 477 U.S. 105, 117-18 (1986); Treas. Reg.
§ 1.170A-13(c)(2)(B) (1984); Rev. Rul. 67-246, 1967-2 C.B. 104, 105.2 14 See I.R.C. § 170(f)(8)(B)(iii) (2006).
2 15 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-I(h)(4)(ii) (1984).
216 I.R.C. § 170(f)(8)(A) (2006).
2 17 See id. § 6115 (requiring merely that the charity provide the donor with a "good faith
estimate of the value of [the] goods or services" provided).2 181Id § 1060(a).
2 1 9 1Id § 1060(b); Treas. Reg. § 1.1060-1(e)(1)(ii) (2001).
220 
.R.C. § 1060(a) (2006).
221 See IRS Form 8283 (revised Dec. 2006), at 2, sec. B (stating that "[a]n appraisal is
generally required" for claiming a deduction of more than $5000).222 See Roger Colinvaux, Charity in the 21st Century: Trending Toward Decay, 11 FLA.
TAX REV. 1, 23 (2011).22 3 See BURTON, supra note 63, at 142.
224
.R.C. § 170(f)(8)(B) (2006).
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be made by the party with the least interest in the valuation (the corporate
sponsor), and the other party (the charity) should be bound to follow the
appraised value as long as it is reasonable.22 5 Finally, borrowing from the tax
rules on the sale of business assets, both the charity and the corporate sponsor
should attach an IRS form to their respective tax returns providing detailed
information and should treat the transaction consistently with the IRS Form for
tax purposes. 226
3. Permitting Incidental Acknowledgments and a Monetary Threshold
Corporate charitable giving is a complex phenomenon. 227 Prior to 1935,
state law frequently prohibited corporate charitable giving on the theory that a
corporation's responsibility was to maximize shareholders' returns, and
donations were ultra vires.228 The tax law did not allow a corporation to claim a
tax deduction for charitable contributions before 1935. Attitudes changed, the
public expected corporations to become good citizens, and state legislatures
repealed the bans on corporate charitable giving. 229 Nevertheless, the federal tax
law still reflects a concern. In contrast to individuals who can claim charitable
contributions up to fifty percent of their modified adjusted gross income, 230
corporations can only claim charitable deductions up to ten percent of their
taxable income.2 31
Part of this lingering concern may reflect that society does not expect
corporations to act with pure altruism.232 Instead, it appears that society always
expects donating corporations to seek some halo effect that will promote the
corporate brand. It is a customary practice that a corporation is acknowledged
with a shout-out if it sponsors a broadcast on public television or national public
radio; for example, "This broadcast was made possible by the generous support
of the XYZ Corporation. " 233
In recognition of this expectation of some halo benefit, if a charity provides
a corporate sponsor with no other advertising impressions, this Article's
22 5 See Treas. Reg. § 1.170(A)-I (h)(4)(ii) (1984).
226 See I.R.C. § 1060(a) (2006).
22 7 See Knauer, supra note 9, at 4 (reporting that "[1]egal scholarship ... posits
disinterested corporate giving" but arguing that a "corporate transfer to charity is not
altruistic; it is intensely self-interested" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
2 2 8 See id. at 15 ("When Congress enacted the corporate charitable contribution
deduction provisions [in 1935] it was encouraging behavior that was ultra vires under state
law.").
229 Id. at 15-16 ("Eventually, all states and the District of Columbia passed legislation
permitting corporate contributions.").
230 1.R.C. § 170(b)(1)(A) (2006) (applicable for cash gifts to public charities). Any
excess can be carried forward for up to five tax years. Id § 170(d)(1).
231 Id. § 170(b)(2)(A) (2006).
2 3 2 See Knauer, supra note 9, at 4 ("[A] corporate transfer to charity is not altruistic; it is
intensely self-interested." (internal quotation marks omitted)).
233 See, e.g., Stone, supra note 13, at 213 (using a similar phrase).
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proposal would allow an incidental acknowledgment with no tax
consequences. 234 Regulators could prescribe the scope of this limited exception
consistent with one-sentence donor acknowledgements consistently employed
on public television and national public radio. Perhaps for a thirty-minute
telecast or broadcast an announcer could mention the corporation as a sponsor
one time, without any comparative advertising and without any description of
products or services.
Also, another limited exception would be appropriate to avoid significant
administrative burdens on small transactions. The tax rules for charitable
contributions employ a variety of dollar thresholds based on various factors. For
example, for donations of less than $250, a contemporaneous written
acknowledgment from the charity is not required.235 For contributions of
property worth more than $500 but less than $5,000, the donor must provide the
IRS with detailed information but need not obtain an appraisal. 2 36 A taxpayer
claiming a deduction of $5000 or more, but less than $500,000, must obtain a
qualified appraisal of the donated property and file an appraisal summary with
IRS Form 8283.237 A taxpayer claiming a deduction of more than $500,000
must attach the qualified appraisal to the tax return.2 38 Special rules apply to
gifts of art work worth $20,000 or more.239
Thus the charitable deduction rules are filled with monetary thresholds. In
this situation, the monetary threshold should exclude sponsorship deals from the
proposal when the amount involved does not justify the administrative costs. A
commercial sponsor likely will need to retain a sports marketing consultant to
value the advertising benefits from non-charitable advertising impressions when
the proposal applies, 240 in part because these consultants treat their precise
valuation techniques as proprietary. 24 1 Although choosing the specific dollar
amount for the threshold likely would not be an exact science, valuations of
non-commercial advertising impressions likely will be more costly and time
consuming than appraisals of art work with comparable value.242 Thus, the
threshold should significantly exceed the current $20,000 threshold employed
for gifts of art. The Secretary of the Treasury may prescribe regulations or other
guidance, aggregating payments from one source to the same recipient or
234 See infra Appendix (proposed new § 513(i)(4)(B)).
23 5 See .R.C. § 170(f)(8)(A).
236 Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(b)(3) (1984).
237 See I.R.C. § 170(f)(11)(C) (2006); Treas. Reg. § 1.170A-13(c)(2) (1984).
Contributions of publicly traded securities are not subject to the appraisal requirements.
.R.C. § 170(f)(11)(A)(ii) (2006).
2 3 8 1.R.C. § 170(f)(11)(D).
23 9 See IRS Form 8283, sec. B, pt. i, item 4 (revised Dec. 2006), available at
http://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-pdf/f8283.pdf.
240 See Ashley & O'Hara, supra note 23, at 19 (consulting an advertising executive who
provided information for the valuation and suggested obtaining "an expert's detailed
study ... to determine the number of ad impressions").
241 See, e.g., Harris, supra note 80, at 28.
242 See supra note 240.
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related persons as a single payment during a year for purposes of applying this
monetary threshold.
4. Clarification on Deducting Part-Purchase and Part-Gift Payments
This Article focuses on the tax consequences to the college or university,
but one clarification of the tax consequences for the corporate sponsors is
appropriate. As discussed, corporations making a single sponsorship payment to
a college may be both buying advertising benefits and making a charitable
donation. 243 A Treasury Regulation provides that "[n]o deduction is allowable
[as a business expense] ... for a contribution or gift by an individual or a
corporation if any part thereof is deductible under section 170 [as a charitable
contribution]. '244 If this Article's proposal is adopted, the IRS should modify
this regulation to allow sponsors to deduct part of a payment as a charitable
contribution and part as a business expense in the nature of a purchase of
advertising.
5. Shoe Deals and Other Endorsements
Although somewhat related, shoe contracts, athletic apparel deals, sports
drink arrangements, and similar understandings should be addressed with
separate rules designed specifically for endorsements. In these arrangements the
corporation makes in-kind transfers of property to the athletic department, 245
and players use the property. Endorsements require special rules because the
corporate sponsor can receive a unique benefit that can pay dividends for
several decades. Specifically, the players may become accustomed to the gear,
equipment, or other supplies they use in school and may tend to buy those items
for the rest of their lives. The Court of Claims has completely denied a
charitable deduction when a corporation provides its products to students at a
discount.246
24 3 See supra notes 3 9 and accompanying text.
244 Treas. Reg. § 1.162-15(a) (2006) (referring to I.R.C. § 162(a), which allows a tax
deduction for business expenses); see also Singer Co. v. United States, 449 F.2d 413, 421
22 (Ct. Cl. 1971) (discussing the history of the regulation).24 5 Athletic apparel giant Under Armour has a $10.6 million deal with Auburn
University, and in 2010 the school's football quarterback "compliantly wore 15 corporate
logos one on his jersey, four on his helmet visor, one on his wristband, one on his pants,
six on his shoes, and one on the headband he wears under his helmet." Branch, supra note 1,
at 94.
246 Singer Co., 449 F.2d at 421 22 (noting that the Singer company contributed sewing
machines to high schools for student use).
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IV. CONCLUSION: THE BENEFITS OF BALANCE
Current law is easy to apply. The rules are clear. 247 Colleges and
corporations can easily structure their deals to provide valuable brand name
promotion to the corporation, while the college athletic department receives big
money and pays no tax. When adopted in the mid-1990s perhaps this was a
reasonable approach to a contentious issue because at that time valuing the
commercial benefits from a sponsorship could have been exorbitantly costly,
immensely time consuming, and yet inaccurate. 248
Times have changed. Corporate sponsorships of college athletics "increased
roughly sevenfold in the nineties." 249 The field of sports marketing is now
replete with experienced consulting firms that regularly assist buyers and sellers
in the huge market of commercial sponsorships of both college and professional
sporting events and facilities.250 These experts have developed techniques for
valuing sponsorships, not as a matter of scholarly curiosity, but rather in
response to market demand. Sellers of sponsorships want to maximize
revenue,2 51 and purchasers want the biggest brand name exposure at the lowest
cost possible. 252
This Article's balanced proposal will allow the tax consequences to match
the economic substance. If a college athletic program provides more than de
minimis advertising benefits to a sponsor, the college will pay tax on part of the
income derived; if the sponsor pays an amount in excess of the value of the
basic advertising benefits received, the college will treat that portion as a tax-
free charitable contribution.
Current law creates an artificial incentive for colleges to promote athletics
and to commercialize their athletic programs. This Article's proposal seeks to
end neither college athletics nor commercialism on campus. Instead, it seeks to
properly tax a college's athletic sponsorship income. Proper taxation will assist
colleges in appropriately balancing education and big-time sports, will raise
significant tax revenues, and will help clarify the debates about big-time
athletics and commercialism on campus.
2 4 7 See I.R.C. § 513(i) (2006); see also supra Part 11 (discussing that if the commercial
sponsorship payments are not contingent on viewership, and the recognition of the sponsor
does not refer to price, or make comparisons to competitors, the college receives the
sponsorship revenue tax free).
248 Congress enacted the current rule in 1997, and authors published a leading article
discussing the calculation of naming rights based on the advertising impressions in 2001. See
supra note 23 and accompanying text.
2 4 9 ZIMBALIST, supra note 121, at 4; see also BURTON, supra note 63, at 49 (naming
rights exploded in the 1990s).250 See supra notes 77 90 and accompanying text.
251 See supra notes 89-90 and accompanying text.
252 In some situations the commercial sponsor may pay more than the market value of
non-charitable advertising impressions to affiliate with a venerable educational institution.
See, e.g., supra notes 3-6 and accompanying text. The commercial sponsor may pay this
excess to enjoy the "halo effect." See Knauer, supra note 9, at 7 n.27.
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APPENDIX: PROPOSED STATUTE
New I.R.C. § 513(i) [replacing current I.R.C. § 513(i)]:
(i) Treatment of Certain Sponsorship Payments
(1) In General
The term "trade or business" shall include any activity carried on for
the production of sponsorship payments, directly or indirectly, in
connection with postsecondary sports programs, even if carried on within a
larger aggregate of activities or endeavors which may be related to the
exempt purposes of the organization.
(2) Calculation of Income
The gross income from sponsorship payments may be calculated based
on the fair market value of comparable advertising impressions in a non-
charitable context. In calculating the amount of unrelated business taxable
income, only expenses directly connected to the sale and furnishing of
advertising and related services to the sponsor shall be deducted, and no
expenses relating to any athletic program generally, including but not
limited to expenses of preparing for and playing the games, or for the sports
facilities or equipment, may be deducted.
(3) Sponsorship Payments
For purposes of this subsection the term "sponsorship payment" shall
mean any payment made by any person engaged in a trade or business
under an arrangement or expectation that such person shall receive benefits
in the form of naming rights, advertising benefits, or the use or
acknowledgment of the name, logo, or product line of such person's trade
or business in connection with a sports activity of one or more
postsecondary educational organizations that receive such payment, or any
similar benefits.
(4) Limitations
The term "sponsorship payment" does not include:
(A) any payment that does not exceed [a monetary threshold]253 (the
Secretary is authorized to issue regulations treating multiple
payments to the same recipient or related persons as a single
payment);
(B) any payment if the only benefit described in paragraph (3) is an
incidental acknowledgment as defined by the Secretary in Treasury
Regulations or other guidance;
(C) any payment which entitles the payor to the use or acknowledgment
of the name or logo (or product lines) of the payor's trade or
business in regularly scheduled and printed material published by
or on behalf of the payee organization;
253 See supra Part II.C.3 (providing guidance for establishing the monetary threshold).
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(D) any payment made in connection with any qualified convention or
trade show activity (as defined in subsection [I.R.C.
§ 513](d)(3)(B)); or
(E) any transfer of property (and not money) used directly by players in
conducting a postsecondary sports activity, including but not
limited to the furnishing of athletic shoes, uniforms or other items,
in connection with an endorsement by the postsecondary
organization through the use of the shoes, uniforms, or other items
by team members.
(5) Reporting Requirements
Any party paying or receiving any sponsorship payment, directly or
indirectly, shall comply with any reporting requirements prescribed by the
Secretary, in Treasury Regulations or in other guidance.
EFFECTIVE DATE
New I.R.C. § 513(i) shall apply to sponsorship payments made under
arrangements entered into on or after the date of enactment.
DRAFTING NOTES
The proposed statute borrows from I.R.C. §§ 513(c) and 513(i). New I.R.C.
§ 513(i)(4) would exclude five types of payments. The first exclusion is for
sponsorship payments below the monetary threshold as discussed in supra Part
III.C.3. The threshold amount should be set to allow relatively small
sponsorship arrangements to proceed without excessive administrative burdens.
The second exception excludes sponsorship payments when the only advertising
benefit provided is an incidental acknowledgment as described in supra Part
III.C.3. The third and fourth exceptions allow current law to continue to tax
print advertising income and exempt income from qualified convention or trade
show activities. The fifth exception excludes transactions involving in-kind
transfers of property (including athletic shoes) used in athletic activities, and
related endorsements of the products. As described in supra Part III.C.5, special
rules are appropriate for shoe deals and other similar endorsements because of
the other benefits provided to the supplier (such as the potential lifelong
patronage of the student athletes).
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